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Abstract 
Maritime piracy is an old concept, the history of which can be traced far way back since the time when the 
human being started using sea as a means of transport. Its criminality was firstly been considered by the 
customary international law even before codification of the same in 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 
and later the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Somali piracy emerged in the 1990s, its 
narrative root causes, and impact brought by it and how it is combated have moved the author to write this paper. 
The International law perception of what constitutes acts of piracy lead the governments of Gulf of Guinea 
coastal states to be solely responsible for maritime security of their countries as well as eliminating piracy acts 
happening in their area. Different from piracy off the coast of Somalia, a stateless country, Gulf of Guinea 
countries have stable governments and thus the principle of sovereignty applies. The combat of piracy in the 
Gulf of Guinea is vested to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) with the aid from 
partner States.This paper focused on impact of Gulf of Guinea piracy to the maritime industry and to the 
countries, effectiveness of the control measures placed to combat piracy and challenges facing the combat of 
piracy in the area. Moreover, the definition of maritime piracy, narrative root causes of piracy off the coast of 
Gulf of Guinea, and lastly, conclusion and recommendations are the areas covered by this paper.  
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1. Introduction 
Maritime piracy is not a new phenomenon in the world maritime trade. It has been observed way back centuries 
for centuries having the same cause but differs in style. Despite its oldest concept into people’s mind piracy has 
never been observed as a friend to the maritime industry, it is indeed an enemy of the sea transportation, an 
enemy to the world economy, an enemy to the consumers and thus it has always been fought. And because it 
comes in the different style and form depending on the need and geographical location, even the way of 
combating it can never be uniform. The advancement of technology resulted piracy of today to be far way 
different from the ancient piracy thus even response by the world on how to combat it should be in accordance 
with the technology advancement. This paper is focusing on the recent piracy activities happening in the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have been observed to grow in an alarming proportions in recent times 
where hi-jacking and kidnaping of ships and its crew happen in great number. The Gulf has been ranked by the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as the area with the third highest incidence of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in the world, following South East Asia and Horn of Africa1. The piracy activities in this area 
involves not only hijack for ransom, but also theft of cash and cargo and siphoning oil carried on board the 
attacked ships. These activities are really endangering safety of navigation. The geographical coverage of these 
activities is in the Nigerian coast water, Togo coast water, Benin coastal water, the waters of Ivory Coast, waters 
of Gabon and other nearby countries of West and Central Africa. These led the London-based Lloyd’s Market 
Association, an Umbrella group of Maritime Insurers, to list these countries in the risk category as Somalia2.  
 
2. Definition of maritime piracy 
 Maritime piracy has been classified, together with others (war crimes and crimes against humanity) as universal 
crime under the international law, whereby all nations may both arrest and punish piracy provided that it has 
been committed on the high seas (terra nullius).3 Piracy under international context has firstly been defined by 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the high seas as illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for 
private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft and directed against another ship or 
aircraft or against persons or property onboard such ships or aircraft on the high seas which is outside of 
                                                          
1 Kofi Mbiah, ‘Unlawful acts in the West African Waters’. Coastal Zone Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts at Sea’s Journal 
edited by Maximo Mejia Jr and Jingjing Xu. Page 127 
2 Claims Journal, a magazine for insurance professionals 
3Article 105 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
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jurisdiction of any State1. This definition has later in 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
article 101, been confirmed and adopted. 
Definition of piracy in the international law eyes has emerged discussion particularly on the 
geographical coverage of the place where piracy activities are considered to have taken place. This definition is 
considered to be narrow as it has left no room for the activities of the same nature happening elsewhere than on 
the high seas. It excludes all the activities of a like that is happening in the territorial waters of a State and within 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a State where no other State than the territorial’s shall have jurisdiction 
over the matter, and International Law could not apply but Municipal Laws of the littoral State where the piracy 
activities are taking place. Piracy activities happening in the Gulf of Guinea have emerged mixed thoughts 
amongst scholars on whether the same fit into the international law definition of piracy or not, this paper will 
also focus piracy within the ambit of international law definition and whether the same is exhaustive. 
 
2.1 The concept of coastal water piracy 
Unlike Somali piracy or others that were only taking place on the high seas, piracy off the coastal water of West 
Africa is evidenced to have occurred in all places from within territorial waters of a coastal state and in the 
exclusive economic zones to the high sea. This brought up some mixed thoughts of what exactly happen in the 
Gulf of Guinea qualifies to be piracy or not, if it does under what concept. 
It is very clear that piracy, under the eyes of the International law happens on the high seas, the area 
with no one’s jurisdiction. So States have universal extraterritorial jurisdiction to try and prosecute according to 
their own laws and procedures, the acts of piracy committed on the high seas. A clear definition of what 
constitutes piracy is one firstly defined by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas2 and later adopted by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 19823. Piracy under UNCLOS involves: 
(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high sea, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii˅against a ship, 
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts 
making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b) 
Thus the definition of piracy under international law is very narrow. It restricts piracy to only actions 
taken on high seas for the private ends and there must be involvement of two ships or aircraft. If the same acts 
are committed in territorial waters that’s not piracy, and if same acts happens on the high seas but with scarcity 
of involvement of two ships it is not piracy as well.  
So, what then are such acts if occur in territorial waters and in exclusive economic zones? Clearing this 
confusion the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has termed those acts that happening within the 
jurisdiction of the coastal States as ‘armed robbery against ships’. So armed robbery as per the IMO is any 
unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than piracy, directed 
against a ship or against persons or property onboard such ship within State’s jurisdiction over such offences4. 
In its reports for piracy and armed robbery from 1984 to March 2015, IMO has separated incidents 
which reported to have taking place in international waters, territorial waters and in ports areas. This is to mean 
that those acts happened in the international waters, as per IMO definition, is piracy; and those that happened in 
territorial waters and in ports areas are, in the eyes of IMO, armed robbery. 
 Despite of the IMO definition of armed robbery against ships, still there is a debate on what actually 
constitute acts of piracy. The debate has gained heat after observing same acts as piracy are committed in 
territorial waters of a State. The acts of piracy happening in the gulf of Guinea Coastal States has as well 
emerged a lot of controversy on how to respond to it. The controversy laid on the nature of the activities itself in 
terms of geographical location where these activities are mostly taking place as against the International Law 
definition of piracy under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Basing on the actual situation, 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) an organ under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
provided an additional definition of piracy to constitute “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with 
the apparent intent to commit theft and any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in 
the furtherance of that act”5. And now, we have piracy activities happening in territorial waters of West Africa 
                                                          
1Article 15 of Geneva Convention on the high Seas, 1958 
2 Article 15 
3 Article 101 
4 International Maritime Organization, Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report on Piracy 2003 – 
September 2005, available at:www.imo.org 
5 Riskintelligence.eu/about/approach/piracy 
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Countries and beyond that.  
2.1.1 Legality of IMB definition of piracy 
The IMB definition of what constitute acts of piracy satisfies piratical actions regardless of the location. Whether 
the acts are conducted within the port area, coastal zones, territorial, EEZ or high seas; it is actually the solution 
of the persistence confusion of what constitutes actions happening in the Gulf of Guinea to a greater extent.  But 
one can ask himself or herself, what is the legality or rather the weight of the ICC-IMB definition of piracy? Can 
it be taken and adopted by States? If the answer is yes, basing on what? 
In answering that, and for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy, the legal definition of what 
constitutes acts of piracy that will serve the commercial and security purpose is required. The definition of piracy 
under the UNCLOS is not satisfactory and it evidenced to have created a confusion and difficulties on 
prosecuting the piracy perpetrators by the respective countries.  The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is an 
organ under h International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), it is the major source of reporting piracy incidents in 
the world. The work is done through the Piracy Reporting Centre based in Kuala Lumpur that was established in 
1992. The reports given is basing on the definition of piracy provided by itself, so the world is received a certain 
number of reported piracy incidents happening in the Gulf of Guinea in a particular year, while the actual 
conduct reported, in its large amount, are outside the ambit of piracy in the International law eyes. One can argue 
this by saying the PRC reports are combination of piracy and armed robbery, that’s correct, but because there is 
no distinct columns of piracy incidents and armed robbery incidents within the report, and also because the 
extent of the IMB definition of piracy is well known, if combined with the majority of unlawful acts against 
ships conducted off the coast of West Africa and its nature, then the conclusion will be that it is not certain if 
what is reported by IMB to be piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is actually piracy in the eyes of International law.  
Although IMB definition of piracy is the one suitable for actual actions that are happening in the Gulf 
of Guinea today, States cannot use it since IMB does not have the authority to create binding laws. So its 
definition of piracy is only creating guidance to the States to follow. But the question will rise on how the State 
party to the UNCLOS have two different provisions of what constitutes piracy, or rather how can a State Party 
have a combined definition with the actual wording of the UNCLOS? These controversies have brought 
challenges on the prosecution of piracy perpetrators as a way of combating and suppression of acts of piracy.  
 
2.2 Geographical coverage of piracy in West Africa 
The Guinea coastal area is comprised of States like Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Togo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. These countries have been affected much by piracy 
activities that are happening in coastal water of West Africa. Most of piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea have 
been observed to take place in territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones that fall within the jurisdiction of 
a coastal state. However, some of the incidents reported to have taken place beyond territorial waters and 
Exclusive Economic Zone of a State. The International Maritime Bureau, in March 1, 2013 reported fifteen (15) 
incidents, including three (3) hijackings, occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. Amongst, eleven (11) have occurred in 
Nigeria. Fifteen crew members were hijacked, one died out of gunshot wound after his tanker fired while 
anchorage in Lagos port1. In another incident, fourteen crew members reported to have been hijacked in different 
four vessels in Nigeria attacked while underway2.  Further, three (3) incidents were reported in February the 
same year to have taken place in the coast of Ivory Coast where two tankers were hijacked, one tanker was taken 
underway 70 Nautical Miles off the Abidjan coast3. 
In the year 2011 ten (10) incidents were reported to happen in the coastal water of Nigeria, twenty (20) 
incidents reported to take place in Benin4. In 2012 a total number of sixty two (62) incidents were reported to 
take place in West Africa waters5. 
The IMB annual reports6 show that in 2013 and 2014 fifty one (51) and forty one (41) incidents 
respectively happened in West Africa region particularly the Gulf of Guinea. Of all the States, Nigeria takes the 
lead.  
In the IBM 2015 quarterly report7 twenty three (23) incidents were reported to happen in the coastal 
States of the Gulf of Guinea between 1 January 2015 and 30 September 2015. Among them twelve (12) incidents 
happened in Nigeria waters, two (2) in the Congo, one (1) in Liberia, one (1) in Ivory Coast, three (3) in Guinea, 
                                                          
1 Pottengal Mukundan, IMB Piracy Report Highlights Violence in West Africa. Available at: http://icc-ccs.org/news/865-imb-
piracy-report-highlights-violence-in-west-africa 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
4  IMB, Piracy Attacks and East and West Africa Dominate World Report. Available at: icc http://www.icc-
ccs.org/home/resources/85-news/711-piracy-attacks--in-east-and-west-africa-dominate-world-report  
5 ICC IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. 2014 Annual Report. Available at: www.icc-ccs.org 
6 Ibid  
7 ICC-IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report 1 January-30 September 2015  
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two (2) in Ghana and two (2) in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
On 18 November 2015 an attempted attack of a product tanker at Pointe Noire anchorage, the Congo1 
was reported. As per statistics the incidents seem to drop in number comparing with 2013 and 2014 where forty 
six (46) and thirty three (33) respectively were reported2. However, the reported incidents are only few in 
number comparing to the actual incidents happening in the Gulf. Many incidents are not reported.  
 
3. Causes of piracy 
There is no uniform causes triggering piracy activities to take charge in a certain area. The causes are diverse and 
complicated, and they tend to differ from one area to another. Weaknesses in law enforcement, weak security 
and poor political environment3 are some of the factors that, when available in an area piracy would emerge; 
Poverty, economic hardship and socio-political instability are common factors for the piracy to emerge4; though 
it is not necessary for all these factors to be available in order for pirates to respond, but where all or more of 
these factors become available, there is a likelihood of piracy to emerge and flourish 
 
3.1 Causes of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is powered by political conflicts and insurgency and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in their claims against the Nigerian government to address social 
inequalities and political differences, robbery of a ship’s cargo, absence of security structure, corruption in the 
oil sector, weak law enforcement and poverty to mention the least.  
3.1.1 Political conflict, insurgency and MEND movement 
Nigeria has been faced by a decade-old conflict between insurgents, the Nigerian state and oil corporations. The 
economic dispossession and political marginalization by the Nigerian government ignited the society of people 
in Niger Delta, the focal point of oil resources, to oppose the Nigeria government claiming the control over their 
oil resources. The western oil companies were sabotaged by tapping oil pipelines and selling oil in the oil black 
market. This conflict engineered by Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) was increasingly 
involved in criminal activities to the coast area beyond the Niger Delta. MEND stretches its arms to engage in 
piracy as a way of gaining power to facilitate the in-land criminal enterprises to fight the Nigerian government5. 
These activities of MEND and other groups spread to the entire coast of the Gulf of Guinea; actually Niger Delta 
conflict plays a big role in the presence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.   
3.1.2 Robbery of ship’s cargo 
Unlike Somali piracy which aimed at kidnapping for ransom, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is focusing on stealing 
cargoes. And Seafarers are seen to be an obstacle for piracy to accomplish their mission. The Gulf of Guinea is 
an increasingly busy maritime region for the transportation of a number of valuable commodities such as gold, 
iron ore, agricultural products and more. It is the primary route to and from major oil producing countries 
Angola and Nigeria. Also with new discoveries of offshore oil in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Liberia, there is an 
expectation of the increase of tanker traffic6. Therefore pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are mainly focusing on oil 
theft that anticipated by the presence of black market for fuel. The ships are hijacked for the purpose of stealing 
the vessel and unloading its cargo. 
It is estimated by Lloyd’s that the losses for the stolen crude oil range between $2 and $6 million dollars 
per incident7. It is reported in 2013 that $5 million dollars’ worth oil was siphoned from the hijacked vessel at 
the port of Abidjan, Ivory Coast8. This and many events of alike have haunted West Africa Countries in recent 
years. 
3.1.3 Absence of security structure 
The absence of security and ineffective mechanism for coastal/port surveillance in the area has also led to the 
influx of piracy activities within the region. The use of private security guards has been banned by the 
governments of West Africa, particularly Nigerian government9. The use of private security guards onboard 
ships has been proven to be effective control measure to deter pirates in the Gulf of Aden; this is not a case in the 
                                                          
1 IMB, Live Piracy & Armed Robbery Report. Available at: icc http://cc-ccs.org/pracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-report 
2 1 Januay-30 September Report, supra 
3 Murphy, ‘Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty money: Piracy and Maritime in the Modern World’ page 28 
4 Mejia, ‘Economic Development, Political Stability, and Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Linkages.’ 
5 Christos Kyrou and Kaade Wallace, The Gulf of Guinea: Maritime Piracy’s New Global Nerve Centre. Available at: 
http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/gulf-guinea-maritime-piracys-global-nerve-center-18429/ 
6  Nick Berg (Editor)’ ‘Piracy’s persistence in the Gulf of Guinea’ African Defense Review. Available at: 
http://www.africandefence.net/piracys-persistence-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/ 
7 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment, Transnational Crime Report page 45 
8 Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘Oil Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea’. Oil Piracy Report page 31  
9  Baltic and International Maritime Council, ‘Security Alert-Nigeria’ online: BIMCO available 
at:<http://www.bimco.org/News/2014/06/16_security_Alert_-_Nigeria.9spx>  
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Gulf of Guinea as there is none of it. 
In addition to that, the local navies are not well equipped to take charge over the security patrol along 
the area of the entire gulf of Guinea. They are less concerned about the events since the stolen goods from ships 
have insurance cover and insurance companies pay the value amount of the stolen goods. These local navies are 
easily bribed by pirates not to make often patrols over the area. So because of this the local navies become 
worthless1. 
3.1.4 Corruption in the oil sector 
Corruption activities in the oil sector have been directly linked by the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The 
inhabitants of this region depend largely on oil revenue, but due to the corruption activities in this sector, only a 
small percentage of revenue reaches a local population. The Gulf of Guinea has eight states rich in oil that 
produced a total of 5 million barrels of oil per day2 and Nigeria alone produces 2.3 million barrels of oil per day3 
Weak and corrupt governmental officials rely on the profits of the oil companies coming from exporting of oil to 
overseas, this lead to mismanagement of resources in the region4.  
3.1.5 Weak law enforcement 
The weak law enforcement is directly connected by the corruption, but this time by the law enforcers. Majority 
of law enforcers are condemned to indirectly support piracy activities along the coastal water of West Africa by 
not responding positively to the events and accepting bribes from the offenders. Pirates take this as an advantage 
to keep on their actions against vessels. Most of West Africa citizens have the least favourable view of the 
integrity of their law enforcement agencies, and the majority of them whom came across with the police felt 
compelled to pay a bribe to the police to escape liabilities5.   
The law enforcement do not end to the police, it is a series of public officials and the legislation itself. It 
is common for public officials to accept bribes for the offenders to escape punishment. Nevertheless, majority of 
these countries for a long time do not have provisions of law provided for the offence of piracy and have not yet 
domesticated provisions of piracy in the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 1982.  
3.1.6 Poverty 
Poverty resulted from unemployment and unequal distribution of the States wealthy particularly in Nigeria, has 
resulted youths who don’t see the future for themselves to engage themselves in piracy activities targeting 
commodities onboard ships. It has been reported that ninety (90) million of the 151 million populations live 
below the poverty line6. The national cake that is made by the presence of oil is only been shared among the few 
elites of the Nigerian society. Dr Christian Bueger, a Cardiff University researcher and editor of an online 
research portal (piracy studies.org), said in an interview with Africa Renewal that piracy tends to be conducted 
or supported by marginalized communities that have not been participating in economic development7. 
 
3.2 Impact of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea States 
It is obvious that piracy activities in the area hinder various developments. This is uniform to everywhere though 
the difference might be in the gravity of the actions and level of impairment. The presence of Piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea has brought a diverse impact to the economic and social development of the area. A lot of money have 
been spent on the fight of piracy in the region. The amount spent by naval and counter-piracy forces of countries 
in the region are estimated to be between $348 and $370 million dollars8.  The estimated amount spent on 
security equipment and Guards is between $150.9 and $225.4 million dollars. In a situation like this insurance 
cost is raised for obvious reason, because of the risks involved; the estimated costs involved for insurance in 
2013 alone is $ 40,101,863 million; the area has turned to be the high risk area. Some ship owners chose not to 
report the incidents simply because they fear the increase of the insurance cover and their ships will be held for 
investigation by authorities9. Apart from high premium incurred by ship owners, there is the increase of crewing 
cost; crew would not be interested to work in such a dangerous and risk environment, to lust them ship owners 
have to increase the wages. Labour costs for seafarers held in custody and for working on the high risk area is 
                                                          
1 Fiorelli, ‘Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea’ KAIPTC occasional paper no. 37 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
4 Tepp, ‘The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non Military Ways of Combating Piracy’ page 191 
5  UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment. Page 56 available at: 
http://issuu.com/openbriefing/docs/organized-crime-in-wst-africa 
6 Deutsche Welle, Emerging Threat: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: http://www.dw.com/en/emerging-threat-
piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/a-16583626 
7 Nirit Ben-Ari, Piracy in West Africa: A Bumpy Road to Maritime Security. Africa Renewal, December 2013 page 12. 
Available at: un.org/africarenewal/magazine/December-2013/piracy-west-africa 
8 Oceans Beyond Piracy Report, The State of Maritime Piracy 2013.page 54, available at: www.oceanbeyondpiracy.org   
9 Alex Younevitch et al, ‘Analysis: West Africa Piracy issue to stay long term, may affect Regional Trade’ edited by Jonathan 
Fox. Available at: Platts.com/latest-news/shipping/London/analysis-west-africa-piracy-issue-to-stay-long-26005753 
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estimated to reach $9,193,651 million1.  Goods are stolen during the attacks causing a huge loss to the shippers 
and/or carriers. Value for goods stolen aboard attacked vessels ranges between $10.1 million to $30.27 million 
and that of ransom collected by pirates is estimated to be $ 1.57 million.2 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea involves violence; severe injuries and death have been observed to happen 
during the attack and hijack. A total number of one thousand two hundred (1,200) Seafarers were affected by 
piracy activities off the coast of West Africa amongst whom three hundred (300) were held hostage. And the first 
three quarter of the year 2014 the number of affected Seafarers increased3. The affected Seafarers are left by 
psychological scars for what they have gone through until their release for those who are lucky. Captain Suresh 
Biradas4 while giving his testimony on what he experienced in pirates custody off coast of Nigeria, said that he 
will never return to the sea again. He says, they kept him in a bare wooden floor of a tiny hut, and the only food 
they had every day is a 70 gram of packet of noodles, nothing else. He was freed after twenty eight (28) days 
after paying off the requested ransom. 
The attack by pirates off the West Africa Coast is associated with violence; gun fire during attack, 
torture and inhumane treatment are among the things Seafarers undergo when they are in pirates’ hands. The 
crew of MT Adour were cruelly beaten and intimidated by the firing of the guns when their vessel was hijacked 
in the year 2013.5  
Not only that, but also several Seafarers have been murdered by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. Their 
level of violence is such extreme to terminate the lives of fellow human beings. In one piracy incident pirates 
throw the ship Captain and Chief Engineer into the cold room the place where fish are stored; they were left 
there and froze to death6.  
3.2.1 Impact of the Gulf of Guinea piracy in the carriage by sea 
Piracy activities have been observed to distract the shipping industry in several arenas. There were so much 
delay caused by rerouting or hijackings, so much loss caused by delays, theft and ransom, the increase of cost of 
the sea transport that affect ship owners, governments as well as consumers have been witnessed, not only in the 
Gulf of Guinea but also wherever piracy activities are involved. Charter parties’ contracts and marine insurance, 
and the entire carriage by sea have been affected much by piracy activities. This part analyses impact of piracy 
basing on the extent by which the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea affect charter-party contracts, marine insurance 
costs and carriage by sea at large. 
3.2.1.1 Impact of piracy activities on the liability of the carrier 
Piracy has brought an impact on Carrier’s liability under shipping contracts. Both carriage of goods by sea and 
carriage of passengers by sea conventions have stipulated for the carriers liability.  Under the carriage of 
passengers there is Athens Convention which provides, under its 2002 protocol, the strict liability for carrier for 
the loss suffered as a result of the death of or personal injury to a passenger caused by a shipping incident7, 
unless the carrier proves that the incident resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a 
natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character8. Piracy is not in the list, however it is 
arguably covered by exception (b) of Article 3 which permits the carrier to escape liability if it can prove that the 
incident was solely caused by intentional acts or omission of the third party. 
On the part of carriage of goods by sea, the liability of the carrier in all three conventions, Hague/Visby 
Rules, Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules is based on fault liability 9 . There is a list of incidents that 
exonerates carrier from liability in the Hague/Visby Rules10 but piracy is not one of them. Hamburg Rules does 
not provide for exceptions to the liability of the carrier, all that carrier needs to exonerate itself, is to prove that 
loss or damage and delay is not caused by its fault or the fault of its servants.11 There is no place where piracy 
have been expressly mentioned but it can be associated by delay on delivery of cargo to the port of destination 
and to the loss and/or damage associated with such a delay that might be caused by piracy activities probably 
resulted from rerouting of the vessel or hijacking of the vessel. So the carrier will only be exonerated if it 
                                                          
1 Ocean Beyond Piracy Report, supra page 54 
2 ibid 
3 ISWAN, Seafarers Affected by Increase in Piracy Related Violence Off West Africa Coast. Modified on 24 September 2014. 
Available at: www.seafarerswelfare.org/news-and-media/latest-news/seafarers-affected-by-increase-in-piracy-related-
violence-off-west-africa-coast 
4 BBC News, Danger Zone: Chasing West Africa’s Pirates. Available at:www.bbc.com/ews/world-africa-30024009 
5 Ocean beyond piracy, State of Piracy Report, supra 
6 Ibid 
7 Article 4 of the protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention Related to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 
1974 that replaced Article 3 of the Convention. 
8 ibid 
9 Article 4 of Hague/Visby Rules, Article 5 of Hamburg Rules and Article 17 of Rotterdam Rules 
10 See Article 4(2) of the Hague/Visby Rules 
11 See Article 5(2) – 5(7) of the Hamburg Rules 
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succeeded in proving that the loss and/or damage to the goods due to delay caused by rerouting to escape high 
risk area or delay caused by hijacking of the vessel by pirates, is not its fault or a fault of its servants and agents. 
The Rotterdam Rules have piracy as an event that carrier’s liability can be exonerated from. The provision says, 
apart from proving absence of fault on its part and on the part of its servant and agents, carrier can be exonerated 
from liability for loss, damage or delay if it proves that loss, damage or delay was contributed by war, hostilities, 
armed conflict, piracy, terrorism, riots, and civil commotions1. However, the Rotterdam Rules have not been into 
effect yet, so carriers are still facing problems in excluding themselves from liability in cases of piracy. Beyond 
the scope of the aforementioned conventions, the parties may agree to apply one of the conventions as 
contractual clauses in a carriage of goods by sea contract. 
3.2.1.2 The impact piracy has in freight 
Piracy activities have contributed to the increase of the ship owners’ costs for the running of the shipping 
transport business in general. Because of piracy ship owners have found themselves  to be faced by new costs of 
security equipment and private armed security, re-routing costs, costs for the increased speed, costs of labour, 
costs for piracy prosecution and imprisonment, costs for the military operations, costs for counter-piracy 
organizations etc. On top of that insurance premiums have been increased due to the increased risk of piracy. To 
compensate the increased costs and in order to earn profit which is the main objective of the business, freight 
was also to be increased. 
The escalation of pirates’ activities in the Gulf of Guinea and the freight increase impact has raised a 
great concerns to the companies that trading along the area, especially oil trading companies. As the incidents 
given less attention, ship owners will keep on assessing the trend of their business and figure out how to get 
profit, which obviously will increase the freight rate for them to cover the increased running costs and remain 
with a good profit. 
3.2.1.3 Impact of piracy activities in charter-party contracts 
Piracy actions that involve hijacking and stealing cargo and property in the coastal states of Gulf of Guinea have 
placed charter party contracts in an ambiguous situation. There are situations when loss occurred, assumptions 
had to be used to include piracy in war clause but there are situations the assumption could not fit. The judicial 
reasoning have been used more than express legal provisions to exclude a party from liability caused by piracy. 
This has particularly done in absence of relevant express provisions of the law in charter contracts. It has never 
been easy for the parties in dispute who bring the dispute into the court and the judges who interpret provisions 
of law and come up with a decision. 
3.2.1.3.1 Piracy and ITL clause in charter party 
There is a case instituted before a court of law that emerged an issue of whether owner’s liability for in-transit 
loss does not extend to loss caused by piracy actions. Parties to this case are Trafigura Beheer BV v. 
Navigazione Montanari Spa [2014]2, the Commercial Court considered whether a charter-party clause making 
owners liable for in-transit loss covered loss resulted from the stolen cargo by pirates. 
In this case the Charterers instituted an action against the owners for in-transit loss of part of the 
premium motor oil cargo. The voyage in question was from Abidjan to Lagos. While the vessel was at position 
in the south west of the port waiting for further orders, it was attacked by fifteen (15) pirates who siphoned an 
amount of oil approximately to 5,300MT. The charterer claimed that owners are responsible under charter-party 
clause i.e. in-transit loss clause (ITL Clause). 
There were two issues t dealt by the court on this case. The first issue was whether the pirates’ removal 
of the transferred cargo constituted in-transit loss under the ITL clause, and the second issue was whether the 
ITL clause imposed a strict liability to the owners or whether the exception clauses applied to exclude liability. 
The court held that the ITL clause did not provide a clear definition of what constitutes in-transit loss, 
so this created uncertainty as it did not even mention the types of loss covered by the phrase. This led the court to 
construe the phrase basing on natural business meaning which was the loss incidental to the carriage of oil 
product such as short delivery caused by quantity calculation errors, remnants of cargo left on-board or loss 
through evaporation; rather than any other loss that arose because of the pirates’ actions.  
There was no point of dealing with the second issue since the first issue was already cleared by the 
court, so the case ended in favour of the owners. 
In the case of the Paiwan Wisdom3, the owners refused to perform charterer’s instructions to load the 
vessel in Hoping, Taiwan and discharge the same to Mombasa, Kenya due to piracy risks in that area. Here the 
Owners relied on provision of Conwartime 2004 which permits the Owners of a vessel to refuse to follow 
                                                          
1 Article 17(3)(c) of Rotterdam Rules 
2  Clyde & Co, CC004726-February 2014. Available at: 
www.clydeco.com/uploads/Files/Articles/2014/CC004726_Trafigura_v_Navigazione_17.02.14 p28 
3  Taokas Navigation SA v. Solym Carriers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1888 (comm) available at: 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=55c5e7b7-cb5b-4be0-9bc2-2de34c41ffed 
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charterers’ orders in certain circumstances where the vessel could be deemed to be at risk. The High Court, 
upholding the arbitrator’s award held that, if threatened or actual acts of piracy constitute a war risk, for a 
purpose of the conwartime 2004 Clause, there is no requirement within that clause that the relevant war risk has 
to escalate since the date of the charter party. This case highlights the importance of establishing whether or not, 
as a matter of construction of charter party, owners have accepted the risk of going to the particular areas of ports. 
Piracy have placed the shipping industry in circumstances like this for a long time, though various shipping 
contract have started to accommodate piracy clauses into the contracts, even Rotterdam Rules by understanding 
the controversy brought to the shipping industry, have incorporated piracy into the list of exceptions to exonerate 
carriers from liability. 
3.2.1.3.2 How piracy affects relationship between ship-owners and charterers on the issue of rerouting of the 
vessel 
It has been a common practice for ship captains in any endangering situation to deviate the ship for safety of 
navigation. Deviation is only allowed in a certain circumstances but generally it is counted as a breach of the 
obligation. The legality of deviation depends on where the instructions are coming from, if from the ship owner 
or a charterer and on top of that whether the reason is viable. Normally deviation is a causative agent of delays in 
voyages which can also resulted to the frustration of the charter-party contracts whether delay is of a shorter time 
or longer one. Piracy activities going on in the Gulf of Guinea have sometimes triggered the breach of the 
obligation and thus to destroy the relationship between ship-owners and charterers. 
3.2.1.3.2.1 Deviation 
Under the charter-party contract ship-owner has an implied obligation not to deviate from the agreed route. 
Deviation has been defined as an intentional and unreasonable change in the geographic route of the voyage as 
contracted1. A few standard charter forms include an express provision for the route to be followed but, in 
absence of such a provision the obligations is presumed in the direct geographical route between the ports of 
loading and ports of discharge. The Master of a ship is under obligation to exercise reasonable care and skills in 
ensuring the success of the charter-party and accordingly is entitled to deviate from the proper course in order to 
ensure the safety of the vessel and its cargo. But the danger that cause the deviation must be of a reasonably 
permanent nature rather than risk of a merely temporary obstruction. Whenever there is justifiable deviation, 
additional costs for it should be assumed by charterers. 
In the Triton Lark case the owners succeeded during arbitration, appeal was lodged by charterers to the 
High Court. The issue before hand was the requirement which owners had to meet under CONWARTIME which 
defines in clause 1 to include acts of piracy. So there was a requirement of showing that in the reasonable 
judgement of the Master of the vessel, the vessel “may be or is likely to be exposed to piracy”. The Judge 
considered that whether there was “likely to be” should be assessed by whether there was “a real likelihood”2. 
That means exposing to acts of piracy does not need to have actual effect on the vessel rather than simply to be 
exposed to the risk of piracy, but the degree of likelihood differs between case and case depending on the facts 
and evidence adduced by the parties. 
This case talked about the risks of piracy in the Gulf of Aden but it is relevant for the Gulf of Guinea 
situation since deviation rule touches the carriage by sea in general and piracy whenever emerged, the deviation 
is considered not to be an option depending on the circumstances. 
Mellish LJ, in the Teutonia’ case said: “It seems obvious that, if a Master receives credible information 
that, if he continues in the direct course of his voyage, his ship will be exposed to some imminent peril, as for 
instance, that there are pirates in his course, or icebergs, or other dangers of navigation, he must be justified in 
pausing and deviating from the direct course, and taking any step which a prudent man would take for the 
purpose of avoiding the danger3.”  
3.2.1.3.2.2 Frustration 
Delays that takes shorter time is more likely to frustrate voyage charter-party than time charter-party. So all in all 
piracy may cause frustration of both time and voyage charter party contracts. 
Frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party, a contractual 
obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called 
for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract4. So it is for the 
court to decide whether the contract was frustrated not basing on the terms of the contract itself but the emerged 
circumstances at hand. Delay in performance of the contract is one of the factors that can be considered for 
frustration.  The decision on frustration is a mixed question of facts and law but at the end courts decided in 
                                                          
1 Tetley, while English courts have been restricted the concept of deviation to geographic deviations, US courts have extended 
it to other departures from the terms of the contract which materially increase the risks to cargo such as unauthorized deck 
carriage (Jones v Flying Clipper (1954) 116 Fed Supp 386) or over-carriage (The Silver Cypress [1944] AMC 895) p 1812 
2 Triton Lark (Pacific Basin IHX Ltd v. Bulk handling Handymax AS) 2011 
3 (1871-1873)LR 4PC 171, 179 
4 John Wilson, quoting the words of Lord Radcliffe, Carriage of Goods by Sea, seventh edition. Page 38 
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accordance of the law. Facts are the passage through the court to reach its decision. 
Different from the past where frustration was impliedly taken into consideration, most of charter-party 
contracts now a days incorporate circumstances which, if occurred the contract may be frustrated.  Piracy, for 
those contracts that has included as risk, is normally included in the war risk clause. BIMCO Standard War Risk 
Clause for Time Charter 1993, for example, in its CONWARTIME 1993 included piracy as war risk1. All in all 
whether the contract shall be frustrated or not depends on the question of material facts and the question of law. 
3.2.1.3.3 If piracy actions render a port unsafe in the concept of Safe Port and Unsafe Port 
The obligation to nominate a safe port is vested to the Charterer. The obligation has now obviated from implied 
one to the express one as most of charter-party contracts have incorporated provisions of the safe port warrant. 
For example Baltime 19392 provides: ‘ The vessel shall be employed in lawful trades for the carriage of lawful 
merchandise only between safe ports or places where the vessel can be safely lie always afloat.’ 
What constitutes a safe port for the purpose of warranty? Does piracy activities going on in the Gulf of 
Guinea and most of it occurs on coastal waters of a State and some while at anchorage position are enough to 
render the port unsafe? Sellers LJ in the Eastern City’s case provided a definition of what constitutes safe port 
regardless of whether the warranty is express or implied and whether in time or voyage charter-party contracts. 
He says ‘A safe port is a place where a chartered vessel may enter, load or discharge, and leave without legal 
restraint and at which the vessel will encounter no perils greater than those of the sea. Whether a port is safe is a 
fact to be determined in each case having regard to the vessel concerned.’3 
Any claim for breach of the safe port undertaking will be limited by the proximity and causation of 
damages rules. In cases where the vessel is trapped in a port by a temporary obstruction such as silting or the 
outbreak of hostilities, there may be claim for damages for detention provided the cause of delay is such as to 
render the port unsafe, otherwise no remedy will be available unless the delay is so prolonged as to frustrate the 
object of the contract4. 
The situation provided by Pirates’ activities in the Gulf of Guinea, especially for those attacks happened 
while vessels are at anchorage, might fit into this scenario. If the chartered vessel invaded by pirates, and the 
goods are stolen, and some injuries and/or death to the crew occur; and the vessel put under detention by 
authorities for the purpose of investigation et cetera, a delay will be caused. And where damages are accrued as a 
result of such an event, then it is fit for the court to award the remedies. 
3.2.1.3.4 Whether piracy activities in e Gulf of Guinea amounts to off-hire of a chartered vessel 
No hire shall be payable during periods when the charterer will not be able to use the vessel because of some 
events or accidents that are within the owner’s area of responsibility. Charter-party standard contracts provided 
circumstances on which the vessel will go off-hire regardless of the same being within owner’s responsibility. 
During such a time, charterer will be compensated for the lost time during off-hire period. 
Does piracy activities falls within the ambit of incidents that might lead to off-hire of the vessel? NYPE 
93 in its off-hire clause lists the following as off-hire events: “Loss of time from deficiency and/or default of 
officers or crew, or deficiency of stores, fire, breakdown of, or damages to hull, machinery or equipment, 
grounding, detention by the arrest of the vessel (unless such arrest is caused by events for such the charterers, 
their servants, agents or subcontractors are responsible), or detention by average accidents to the vessel or cargo 
unless resulting from inherent vice, quality or defect of the cargo, dry docking for the purpose of examination or 
painting bottom, or by any other similar cause preventing the full working of the vessel”.5 
Whether off-hire is caused by hijack of the vessel by pirates fall within the meaning of the clause 
incorporated in the charter-party contract. In the case of Osmium Shipping Corporation v. Cargill International 
SA6, the Commercial Court considered an off-hire of a ship while held by pirates. In this case the Owners and 
Charterers entered into charter-party contract in respect of the vessel Captain Stefanos. The contract was under 
NYPE 1946 and the vessel fixed its voyage from South Africa through Suez Canal to the intended port of 
destination. While on its way, the vessel was on 21 September 2008 hijacked by pirates and was released on 6 
                                                          
1 1. For the purpose of this clause the words: (b) “War Risks” shall include any war (whether actual or threatened), act of war, 
civil war, hostilities, revolution, rebellion, civil commotion, warlike operations, the laying of mines (whether actual or 
reported), acts of piracy, acts of terrorists, acts of hostility or malicious damage, blockades (whether imposed against all 
vessels or imposed selectively against vessels of certain flags or ownership or against certain cargoes or crews or otherwise 
howsoever), by any person, body, terrorist or political group, or Government of any State whatsoever, which, in the 
reasonable judgement of the Master and/or the Owners, may be dangerous, or are likely to be or to become dangerous, to the 
vessel, her cargo, crew or other persons on board the vessel. 
2 Clause 2 of the  Baltime 1939 
3 [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 at p 131 
4 John Wilson, supra p. 29 
5 Clause 17 of NYPE 93 
6 [2012] EWHC 571 (Comm) retrieved from incelaw.com/en/documents/pdf_library/strands/shipping/shipping-e-brief-may-
2012.pdf 
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December 2008. The charterers contended that while under pirates’ custody the vessel was off-hire. The London 
Arbitration Tribunal held the vessel was off-hire during the time of the hijack until the day of its release, basing 
on the wording of the rider clause 56 of the charter contract which stipulates that: 
 “Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage by reason of and accident or breakdown, or in the event 
of loss of time either in port or at sea or deviation upon the course of the voyage caused by …capture/seizure, by 
detention or threatened detention by any authority including arrest, the hire shall be suspended…” 
The Owners being aggrieved by the decision they appealed to the Commercial Court. The Judge, Mr. 
Justice Cook held that, the starting point when construing clause 56 of charter-party was to look for the ordinary 
and natural or conventional meaning of the language used in the context of the agreement, the parties’ 
relationship and the relevant facts surrounding the transaction so far as known to the parties. Upholding the 
Arbitrators decision Mr. Justice Cook concluded that the wording used and the structure of the clause all 
supported the Charterers submission. 
Piracy activities going on in the Gulf of Guinea brings the same effect and even more to the shipping 
contracts. 
INTERTANKO and BIMCO have incorporated piracy clauses in their standard form contracts in 
December 2008 and March 2009 respectively. Provisions of piracy under BIMCO stipulate that the vessel shall 
remain on hire during incidents of piracy, although those particular issues are sometimes modified by reducing 
the rate or adding a limit in terms of time or amount. 
In Time charter 2013 the piracy clause expressly stated that “…the charterers shall indemnify the 
Owners for any claim from holders of Bills of Lading…if the Owners become liable to pay to the crew any 
bonus then the bonus shall be reimbursed to the Owners by charterers…Charterers shall reimburse the Owners 
any additional premiums required by the Owners’ insurers. 
 
3.3 Impact of Gulf of Guinea piracy in marine insurance 
Insurance cover is important to many aspects of human life as protection against risks surrounded the same. 
Shipping transport as an aspect in human life is also attracted for protection against risks involved the business. 
Insurance protection as itself is a business, whereupon various insurance companies have tuned themselves to 
offer the service to the need and charging insurance premium as consideration for the service offered. In 
shipping transport there are risks in its diverse that involves the business, piracy is one of them. Insurance 
protection for shipping is not an option, it is compulsory and there are laws to govern that for the safety of 
maritime navigation and it has been there for decades.  
Shipping insurance comes in four main types; war risk insurance that cover for the vessels sailing in 
war risk areas, cargo risk insurance for cargo that is transported by the vessel, hull and machinery insurance for 
any physical damage of the vessel and kidnap and ransom risk cover for the vessels that are traversing the high 
risk areas where piracy activities are mainly taking place. Piracy is covered by the Hulls and Machinery and 
freight clauses under the current MAR policy form.1  The London market incorporated standard Hull clauses 
whereby piracy is recognized as marine peril. However, under the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan of 1996 
piracy risk is covered under the Hull-War Risk insurance. Piracy also is covered in the War Risks Additional 
Expenses for cargo transported by sea. This can lead to double payment if an assured person is insured by the 
London market for marine risks and at the same time is also insured by the Norwegian market for hull-war 
insurance.2 The Mutual War Risk Associations will not find a way to dismantle this overlapping payments. 
Section 803 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is expressly provides for double payments, so it practically 
resolves the problem but underwriters need to enforce it.    
Gulf of Guinea piracy has contributed to the incorporation of new clauses related to it in some of the  
marine insurance contracts and in others have resulted to additional of risks of piracy. For example it has been a 
practice since the influx of Somali pirates and now West Africa pirates, for the underwriters to formulate a 
kidnap and ransom (K&R) policies which aimed at fostering investigations, negotiations and funding of the 
ransom money demanded. The impact did not end in incorporation only but also the increase in insurance 
premium for those vessels doing business around the areas identified as high risk areas and those vessels 
                                                          
1 Clause 6 of Perils under the Institute Time Clauses Hulls, 6 (6.1.5) and Clause 7 of Perils under the Institute Time Clauses 
Freight, 7 (7.1.5) 
2 Soyer, Baris. Marine Insurance Fraud (2014) at page 221 available at: https://books.google.com 
3 (1) Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance, each insurer is bound, as between himself and the 
other insurers, to contribute rate ably to the loss in proportion to the amount for which he is liable under his 
contract. 
(2)If any insurer pays more than his proportion of the loss, he is entitled to maintain an action for contribution 
against the other insurers, and is entitled to the like remedies as a surety who has paid more than his proportion 
of the debt. 
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traversing the area. Among piracy related insurance, war risk and kidnap and ransom risk are the ones. The 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs have clearly defined that, they do not cover ransom payments. Most of the 
vessels are insured against piracy under their war risk insurance and when piracy are included in war risk 
insurance companies is charged for additional premium if a ship is trading in the pirate area1. 
In 2008 the insurance premium was reported to have increased ten times higher for the vessel traversing 
high risk areas as a result of growth of pirate attacks. The amount could be more than that if all the incidents are 
reported. Most of pirates attacks in West Africa waters go unreported, IMO reveals that about 2/3 of piracy 
incidents happening in Gulf of Guinea are not reported2. The reason behind this is the subsequent increase in 
insurance premium and probably because the increase is not proportional to the value of the claim for smaller 
attacks, and the time consuming procedure of reporting pirate attack that could lead to significant delay. 
 
4. Nature of piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea 
Maritime piracy, as old the phenomena is, has never been uniform. As earlier mentioned, since the beginning of 
it piracy kept on changing its modes of operation in terms of time when these activities are taking place, the area 
where the same are conducted and target of the perpetrators. Piracy of the ancient time was focused on theft of 
valuable things and the money, it is different from the contemporary piracy which if theft is the target then it is 
cargo theft, otherwise ransom is the main business. The contemporary piracy also has different forms depending 
on the purpose of committing the offence and the area where the same is taking place. 
This part is focusing on the nature of piracy activities that are currently happening in the Gulf of Guinea. 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) ranked Gulf of Guinea as the highest third position after 
South East Asia and Horn of Africa for piracy and armed robbery incidents3. The Gulf of Guinea piracy is of 
three kinds, firstly it focuses in theft of cash and cargo, secondly the pirates focuses on ransom money and 
thirdly it involves violence resulted into injuries and killing of crew members as vividly observed on the case 
scenarios hereunder discussed.  
Pirates have continued to flourish in attacking vessels even up to date. In the years 2015/2016, more 
than twenty (20) incidents were reported to take place in the coastal waters of Gulf of Guinea particularly in 
Nigeria waters between January 2015 and April 2016.  
Piracy actions against ships along the coastal water of West African countries were observed to focus 
on stealing cargo, cash and other valuable things in the ships. Mostly, the focus is on petroleum cargo carried on 
small crafts known as chemical tankers or product tankers. Piracy activities off Nigeria had been reduced for 
some time, however, the end of 2015 as the above narrated events show, was observed for pirates to become 
more active in Nigeria waters. It is presumed that a sudden increase on piracy activities from October 2015 is a 
result of an announcement concerning uncertainty over the future of the amnesty agreement between the 
Nigerian president and former militants in the region. The said announcement was protested by former militants 
on 14 December 2015 in Wari, Delta state, amid reports the government was planning to cut the amnesty budget. 
Such a move could see ex-militants return to piracy and organized crimes in the region.4 
During the years 2010 – 2014 as per the IMO piracy and armed robbery reports, most of incidents 
happened in the Gulf of Guinea took place in international waters than territorial waters. This signifies the 
growth and the gravity of piracy acts along the area.  Before, most of these incidents were happening in 
jurisdictional waters of the West African States which is territorial waters and in ports areas. The area now is 
very risky and dangerous for the safety of navigation. The 2014 IMO report of piracy and armed robbery for 
West Africa Countries demonstrates a total of forty five (45) incidents were reported to have happened. The 
number has decreased compared to fifty four (54) and sixty four (64) incidents reported to have happened the 
years 2013 and 2012 respectively5. Amongst those, twenty eight (28) were reported as successful attack (nine 
incidents took place in high seas, another nine took place in territorial waters, ten incidents took place in ports 
areas)6 and seventeen (17) incidents were reported as attempts (seven took place in high seas, six in territorial 
waters and four in ports areas)7. The number of actual committed incidents in 2014 in high seas tallied with those 
happened in territorial waters but exceeded by those happened in ports areas while attempts committed more in 
                                                          
1 Piracy FAQs. www.igpandi.org, revised August 2013 
2  Benedkovic and Vuletic, Piracy influence on the Ship Owners and Insurance Companies. Page 6 available at: 
http://web.efzg.hr/dok/TRG/jbendekovic/26780_e_x_Vuletic.pdf 
3 Koffi Mbiah, ‘Unlawful Acts in West African Waters’ page 127 of the book Coastal Zone Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts at 
Sea. By Maximo Mejia Jr and Jingjing Xu. 
4  World Maritime News Staff, ‘Nigeria Arrests 1,610 Pirates in 2015’. January 6, 2016 available at: 
worldmaritimenews.com/archives/180230/Nigeria-arrests-1610-pirates-in-2015 
5 International Maritime Organization, Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. MSC. 4/Circ. 219. Annual 
Report. 28 April 2015 
6 Ibid Annex II page 2 
7 Ibid Annex II page 1 
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high seas followed by territorial waters and less in ports areas. If combined, results will be that more incidents 
have been committed in high seas. Seven (7) vessels were hijacked, fifteen (15) incidents involved threat and 
actual violence, sixty six (66) crew members held by pirates, forty one (41) assaulted, two (2) were wounded and 
one (1) killed.  
In addition to that, there are more allegedly attempt recorded to have occurred in high seas than in 
territorial waters and ports areas the year 2013 by proportions of fourteen (14) attempts, one (1) attempt and five 
(5) attempts1, while successful attacks reported shows that thirteen (13) incidents occurred in high seas, five (5) 
in territorial waters and sixteen (16) took place in ports areas2. The overall incidents reported to take place on the 
high seas overweighs those happened in territorial waters and in ports areas. In this year, nine (9) vessels were 
hijacked and subsequently released. Violence and threat of violence were witnessed in a total number of twenty 
two (22) incidents, ninety three (93) crew members were held by pirates and one (1) reported to have been 
assaulted.  
In the year 2012 the reports shows that the total number of the allegedly attempted attacks happened 
throughout that particular year is nineteen (19) whereby eight ˄8˅ of them took place in international waters, 
six ˄6˅of them took place in territorial waters and the remaining five ˄5˅took place in ports areas3 while the 
actual attacks reported to occur in international waters is seventeen (17), nine (9) incidents were committed in 
territorial waters and nineteen (19) in ports areas4. The overall international waters incidents overweigh those of 
other waters. Again, nine (9) vessels were hijacked, also violence were observed in twenty three (23) incidents,  
one hundred and twelve (112) crew members were held by pirates, four (4) were reported dead and another four 
(4) were wounded. 
Further, in the year 2011 the IMO reported nine (9) allegedly attempt incidents to happen in the 
international waters, five (5) in territorial waters and three (3) in ports area5. During the same year ten (10) 
successful attacks happened in the high seas, fifteen (15) incidents occurred in territorial waters and nineteen (19) 
in ports area6. The total attacks were forty four (44) and attempted attacks were seventeen (17), twenty two 
˄22˅ incidents were reported to involve threat and actual violence to crew members, eight (8) vessels were 
hijacked during the material year, sixty eight (68) crew members were held by pirates and two (2) were wounded. 
More incidents happened in ports area followed by those happened in territorial waters and lastly those took 
place in international waters. 
And during the year 2010 a total number of thirty seven (37) piracy and armed robbery actual attacks 
were reported to happen in the Gulf of Guinea. Whereby six (6) attacks took place in the high seas, fifteen (15) 
attacks happened in territorial waters and sixteen (16) attacks were committed in ports area. Twenty one attacks 
involved a threat and actual violence towards crew members, two (2) vessels were hijacked, seven (7) crew were 
wounded, the other four (4) were assaulted and forty two (42) were held by pirates7. The report also shows a 
total number of ten (10) allegedly attempts have been committed in that particular year, the description of which, 
four (4) attempts happened in the high seas, four (4) happened in territorial waters and two (2) happened in ports 
area8.  
The charts below describe piracy and armed robbery incidents in ports areas, territorial sea and high sea 
reported to and recorded by the International Maritime Organization from 2010 to 2014.  
 
                                                          
1 International Maritime Organization, Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. MSC. 4/Circ. 208 Annual 
Report. 1 March 2014 Annex 2 page 1 
2 Ibid Annex 2 page 2 
3 International Maritime Organization, Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. MSC. 4/Circ. 193 Annual Report. 
2 April 2013 Annex 2(A) page 1 
4 Ibid Annex 2 (B) page 2   
5 International Maritime Organization, Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. MSC. 4/Circ. 180 Annual Report. 
1 March 2012. Annex 2 page 1 
6 Ibid Annex 2 page 2 
7 International Maritime Organization, Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. MSC. 4/Circ. Annual Report. 1 
April 2011. Annex 2 page 1 
8 Ibid Annex 2 page 2 
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Source: IMO Reports 
It can be seen from the above mentioned statistics that unlawful acts against ships in the Gulf of Guinea 
is everywhere, from ports area to the territorial waters and to the high seas. Although they have been classified 
into piracy and armed robbery according to the geographical location where they are taking place, these activities 
are quite similar in methods and results, and perpetrators have the same intention of committing unlawful acts 
against vessels. The classification of these acts have contributed to the hindrance in effectively combating and 
suppressing the same. The States, where unlawful acts against ships are taking place have joined forces to 
combat it but yet there are challenges faced. These challenges will be pointed out as the discussion goes on.   
 
5.  The control measures set to combat acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
In every endangering situation there must be strategies sought in order to calm the situation. Piracy activities in 
the gulf of Guinea are alarming in a sense that both regional and international measures needed to combat the 
situation. The rate of killings, torture inflicted to crew members held hostage, attacks and amount of oil siphoned 
and ransom taken urged the international community to set an eye and oversee what is going on in the gulf and 
strategize on ways to help West African community to tackle the situation. 
Efforts to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea can be sectioned into those efforts set by the international 
community and those combined efforts by the West Africa Regional countries. In the former, analysis is more 
likely to touch what have so far done and the legal capacity of the international community, according to the 
nature of the situation, to intervene the matter; while in the later the focus will be on the efforts made and the 
effectiveness of the same towards combating piracy in the region. 
 
5.1 Efforts done by the International Community 
In every endangering situation there must be strategies sought in order to calm the situation. Piracy activities in 
the gulf of Guinea are alarming in a sense that both regional and international measures needed to combat the 
situation. The rate of killings, torture inflicted to crew members held hostage, attacks and amount of oil siphoned 
and ransom taken urged the international community to set an eye and oversee what is going on in the gulf and 
strategize on ways to help West African community to tackle the situation. 
Efforts to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea can be sectioned into those efforts set by the international 
community and those combined efforts by the West Africa Regional countries. In the former, analysis is more 
likely to touch what have so far done and the legal capacity of the international community, according to the 
nature of the situation, to intervene the matter; while in the later the focus will be on the efforts made and the 
effectiveness of the same towards combating piracy in the region. 
Due to the increasing piracy threats in the Gulf of Guinea, the need for the international community to 
build on the Security Council resolution 2018(2011) was observed in order to counter the growing menace of 
piracy in West Africa’s gulf of Guinea through coordination and logistical support to regional security 
initiatives.1 
                                                          
1 SC/10558 Security Council 6723rd  Meeting(Am) 
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The United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in responding to the resolution 20181 on piracy in 
the gulf of Guinea, an outcome of the lobbying letter written by the Benin president, Boni Yayi to all members to 
ensure smooth passage of the resolution done during the Nigeria presidency of Security Council2, in November 
2011 assembled a team to examine the situation in the gulf of Guinea3. This helped to draw attention to the 
problem; it was resolved, in that meeting, to convene a regional summit as to form a united front by the affected 
West Africa Countries4. The comprehensive maritime security framework across national boundaries observed to 
be an utmost need to combat piracy in the gulf countries. Also technical and logistical assistance from the 
International Community was seen to be of crucial. 
West Africa piracy activities were observed to undermine socio-economic development efforts in the 
region and it was becoming more violent and systematic, targeting lucrative cargo such as oil carried onboard 
tankers rather than taking hostages for ransom as in East Africa. Therefore, Gulf of Guinea countries saw the 
need of having a united front in order to respond effectively to the growing threat of piracy along their coast. The 
United Nations Security Council resolutions 2018 and 2039 urged the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat maritime piracy in the Region. 
The Security Council resolutions pertaining the gulf of Guinea piracy activities were taken into 
considerations by various countries, thus to join the efforts by providing various assistance to the West Africa 
countries affected by piracy. The support is focused on capacity building for naval forces including training, 
equipment and boats to boost the area’s maritime security and enable them to deter attacks and rapid response to 
the same. 
5.1.1 The United States of America support towards combating piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
The United States navy donated boats and carried out training in Nigeria through its Africa Partnership Station 
programme,5 this was designed to provide quality military training to sailors and leaders of partner states. This 
has facilitated the improving of the country’s Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) by setting up 
radar, radio equipment and Automated Identification System (AIS) at several sites along the coast.6 United States 
of America also supports maritime security exercises like the operation Hot Pursuit involving the Togo and 
Benin navies in September 2012.  
Apart from that, in January 7, 2014 the United States of America passed a Bill encouraging the 
increased cooperation between the United States of America and West and Central African countries to fight 
armed robbery at sea7. The measures follow the US Africa command’s ongoing efforts to train national forces in 
the Region and to promote relationships between nations to combat sea crimes8. Under the umbrella of African 
Partnership Station (APS), it has organized multinational naval training exercises known as Obangame Express 
conducted in Calabar, Nigeria in February 2012 and in Douala, Cameroon in March 2011.  
5.1.2 France support to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
France is very much supportive to its former colonies using bilateral contracts. It has been involved in 
strengthening maritime security to these countries and enable them to combat sea crimes. In 2011 France began a 
three year project helping Benin, Togo and Ghana draw up national maritime security strategies, train civilians 
and armies and improves co-ordination between the three neighboring countries 9 . France also support the 
ASECMAR (Support for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea) by providing €800,000 to strengthen the 
project which was later include Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Guinea10. Its warships stationed in the gulf of Guinea to 
train local navies and also to deter pirates. 
5.1.3 United Kingdom efforts to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
The United Kingdom contributed in the fight against piracy through the Association of Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF)’s effort to establish a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre 
(MTISC) in Ghana. The MTISC is intended to collect and disseminate information on security incidents in the 
                                                          
1 Security Council Resolution 2018, S/RES/2018. 31st October 2011 
2 United Nations Security Council S/2012/45. Report of the United Nations Assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea ( 7 to 24 November 2011) available at: 
oceanbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/S.C._Sec_Gen_Letter_GoG_Piracy_2012.pdf 
3 Republic Togolese: ‘Gulf of Guinea needs regional anti-piracy strategy’, 29-02-2011 Retrieved on 29-02-2011 
4 Ibid 
5 “The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone.” Crisis Group Africa Report No. 195. 12th December 2012 pg. 22 
6 Ibid 
7 The Bill is available at: www.gvtrack.us/congress/bills/113/sres 288/txt. 
8 Captain Dave Rollo quoted in Donna Miles “African Common Help Partners Promote Maritime Security.” American Press 
Service, October 28, 2013 
9 The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone-supra 
10 ibid 
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entire gulf of Guinea through a secured website1. 
5.1.4 Peoples’ Republic of China efforts to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
The Peoples’ Republic of China through its efforts to help combating piracy in the gulf, China’s permanent 
representative to the United Nations, Wang Min repeatedly encouraging the International Community to join 
hands to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea. He says “we call upon the International Community to give 
necessary assistance to the countries concerned and relevant regional organization by sharing information and 
experience, providing technological assistance and enhancing capacity building”. 2  He assured that Chinese 
Government will continue to give assistance within its capabilities. In September 2011 China offered Benin €4 
million for the purchase of patrol boat3.  
5.1.5 Japan efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea  
Japan was not left behind, having authorities given by the United Nations Security Council through its 
Resolution4, in March 2014 contributed $1 million to the IMO West and Central Africa Maritime Security Trust 
Fund in order to eliminate piracy in the gulf of Guinea5. Japan’s contribution to the Trust Fund is aimed at 
supporting the West and Central African countries to implement code of conduct inaugurated for the purposes of 
preventing piracy activities and other maritime related crimes, within their territorial waters as well as 
international waters for the sake of securing safety for the International Transport. 
 
5.2 Legality of the International Community to fight for the gulf of Guinea piracy 
The international community is responding in accordance with the international law whenever there is an urgent 
situation that needs its attention. And the applicability of the international law by the international community is 
universally on areas of no man’s jurisdiction. Again on issues of maritime piracy the provisions of the United 
Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea 6 are very clear that according to its definition piracy is only 
happening on the high seas where no State has jurisdictions over the areas but States all together have universal 
jurisdiction over the areas to arrest and try the offenders. 
The International Community have no authority over the matters happening within the territorial waters 
of a State. This is because every State is sovereign7 and it cannot be interfered by any other State over its matters. 
Piracy activities transpired in the Gulf of Guinea happening within and outside territorial waters of a coastal state 
unlike Somalia, where there is no stable government to deal with matters pertaining within the area, all West 
Africa countries have stable sovereign governments with municipal laws governing the conducts of whatever 
happening in there. And as per definition of piracy under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
19828 maritime crimes happening within the territorial waters are not piracy, rather, armed robbery even if all the 
elements and the modus operandi and weapons used are same as those crimes taken place on the high seas and 
defined as piracy. So, in situations like this the international law cannot apply, that makes the international 
community not to have teeth to bite over the situation. 
Therefore, although the international community gives its hand to the West Africa’s gulf of Guinea 
coastal states to fight for piracy activities, due to the nature of the piracy in the gulf of Guinea, and with 
accordance with the definition of piracy as aforementioned discussion, the United Nations is only focusing on 
helping the gulf of Guinea coastal states to strengthen their Regional Maritime Security in order to combat piracy 
activities. The assistance is based on provision of equipment, logistical tools, training and facilitation. The 
United Nations Security Council, when passing two resolutions9 in 2011 concerning the issue of piracy in the 
gulf of Guinea urged States to reinforce domestic legislations, develop comprehensive regional counter piracy 
framework, issue appropriate guidance to shipping and cooperate in prosecuting pirates and their backers.   
 
5.3 Regional efforts put forward to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
Due to the nature of piracy activities in the gulf of Guinea whereby some of piracy attacks are happening within 
                                                          
1 ibid 
2 Andrew S. Erickson, Piracy’s Next Frontier: A Role for China in Gulf of Guinea Security? Neptune Security Group, 
December 10, 2013 available at: http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/piracy-next-frontier-a-role-for-china-in-gulf-of-
guinea-security/ 
3 Roger L. Phillips, an Arms Race at Sea. November 8, 2011. Available at: http://piracy-law.com/page/22/ 
3  Gard, Togo Implements New Antipiracy. July 4, 2012. Available at: 
gard.no/content/20651727/Gard%20Alert%20Togo%20implements%20news%20anti-piracy%20measures.pdf 
4 SC/10558 supra 
5  IMO, “Japan Gives One Million Dollar Boost to GoG Fund”. March 17, 2014 available 
at:www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/06-japanfund.aspx#.VvP3O8uqpBc 
6 Article 101 
7Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, 1945 
8 supra 
9 supra 
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territorial waters of the State. And as for the coastal states comprised into the gulf area, their governments are 
sovereign so no one has a sole mandate to intervene the matter without the cooperation and willingness of States 
concerned. Regardless how capable they are, and regardless how skillful they are, without partnership and 
agreement with the countries of the gulf of Guinea, the developed countries do not have locus standi over the 
matter happening within territorial waters of a state. Thus, understanding all that the regional states formulated 
plans and strategies, and also gulf of Guinea coastal states have entered into bilateral agreements with the partner 
states in strengthening their energy in combating piracy actions along the area.  
In line with the assistance of the partner states, the coastal countries of the gulf of Guinea, through their 
economic communities have developed various strategies and plans for combating piracy in the gulf of Guinea. 
The economic communities of Central and West African countries formulated various plans to eliminate piracy 
activities within their territorial waters and to strengthen maritime security over the area.  
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) have since back 2002 been working with the economic 
communities of west and central African states on various issues concerning peace and security over the region. 
This was a result of a delicate state of peace between countries of west and central Africa. As a way of pushing 
the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture’s goal (APSA) which have five components1 
but none of them directly touch the maritime security issues, the AU worked closely with ECOWAS and 
ECCAS. Having discovered the lacunae present in APSA, the AU adopted, in 2009, Africa’s Integrated 
Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2 aimed at effective management of Maritime Security issues as part of broader 
continental security priorities. As the piracy activities erupted in the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea, the AU 
adopted in December 2011 the draft 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (2015 AIM - Strategy) aimed at 
seeking to articulate an overreaching, coherent, multi-layered African – driven long term common vision to 
address Africa’s maritime challenges and opportunities 3 . Also, the AU, during this workshop was set to 
cooperate with ECOWAS, ECCAS, the GGC and the United Nations regional offices for Central and West 
Africa (UNOCA and UNOWA), to prepare for the Yaounde summit in 2013.  
Together, they formulated a code of conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against 
ships, and other illicit maritime activity west and central Africa and signed by 24 States that comprise West and 
Central Africa, which are; Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, Congo DRC, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial 
Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad and Togo. Signed in  
Yaounde, Cameroon on 25 June 2013, the Code was inaugurated purposely for the State Parties to co-operate to 
the fullest possible extent in repression of inter alia, transnational organized crime (piracy inclusive) in the 
maritime domain towards sharing and reporting relevant information, interdicting ships and/or aircraft suspected 
of engaging in transnational organized crime in the maritime domain and other illegal activities at sea, ensuring 
that persons committing or attempting to commit transnational organized crime in the maritime domain and other 
illegal activities at sea are apprehended and prosecuted; and facilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation 
of seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard personnel and passengers subjected to transnational organized crime in 
the maritime domain etc., particularly those who have been subjected to violence.4  
The signatories to this Code of Conduct were urged to develop and implement appropriate national 
maritime security policies to safeguard maritime trade from all forms of unlawful acts, to develop and implement 
national legislations, practices and procedures that provide the security for the safe and secure operation of port 
facilities and ships at all security levels, and national legislations which ensure effective protection of the marine 
environment. Also they are intended to establish a national maritime security or other system for coordinating 
the related activities between the departments, agencies, control authorities, and other organizations of the State, 
port operators, Companies and other entities concerned with, or responsible for the implementation or 
compliance or enforcement of measures to enhance maritime security and search and rescue procedures; to 
establish national maritime plan for harmonizing and coordinating the implementation of security measures 
designed to enhance the security in the international maritime transport sector; and to prosecute, in their 
domestic courts and in accordance with relevant domestic laws, perpetrators of all forms of piracy and unlawful 
acts against seafarers, ships, port facility personnel and port facilities.5 
                                                          
1 The AU peace and Security Council, a continent-wide rapid early warning-early response system, council of the wise 
(acting as an organ for strengthened mediation), the African standby force and implementation of a political framework for 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
2 Dr Charles Ukeje and Professor Wullson Mvomo Ela, African Approaches to Maritime Security – the Gulf of Guinea. 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Series No. 11 page 29 
3 ibid 
4 Article 2 (1) of Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime 
Activity in West and Central Africa 
5 Article 4 of the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime 
Activity in West and Central Africa. 
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But before this Code of Conduct which came on 2013, enough were already been done by the 
Economic Communities of West and Central African States as well as individual States on their own capacities 
since the year 2009 or even before, as efforts to combat piracy activities emerged in their localities. 
5.3.1 The Efforts done by the Central African States to combat piracy along the gulf of Guinea 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 2009 created a Regional Coordination Centre 
for Maritime Security of Central Africa (CRESMAC) for the purpose of combining military and civilian skills of 
member countries and to promote a cooperation between the Gulf of Guinea Commission and Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the objective of which, is to share information and management, 
to jointly do surveillance of maritime space, to harmonize the sea activities and other maritime related issues. 
For effective control and protection of maritime security over the region, ECCAS has divided the entire 
area into zones A, B and D. The most dangerous zone where frequent piracy activities take place is zone D 
which comprised of Cameroon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The maritime 
surveillance agreement were entered and signed by the respective countries in May 2009.1 
The SECMAR has succeeded naval resources of State Members and it has opened multinational 
coordination centre in Douala, which is responsible for liaison between the radar stations of participating 
countries and their marine operated centres.2 The plan is also aimed at, inter alia, the use of arms against pirates 
and to carry out joint operation involving International partners. 
The United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, during the 36th meeting of United Nations 
Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) that was held in Kigali, 
Rwanda, commended the committee for its pioneering efforts to address piracy and armed robbery through the 
active collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission (GGC)3 
Angola, a central African country, by understanding the importance of combating acts of piracy and 
armed robbery which are rampant in the area, prepared itself to host an International Conference on Maritime 
and Energetic security in Luanda in 2015. Georges Chicoti, the Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs announced 
and quoted by Nick De Vlaminck, that Angola prepared to host the said conference in order to counter piracy 
activities in the region, but effective cooperation within the region is mostly needed for effective control of 
piracy activities.4  
5.3.2 Efforts placed by the West African Countries to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
The fight for piracy activities seem to be hard when conducted solely by an individual country. This is because 
of the nature of piracy itself and its modus operandi which normally taking place at sea where it is difficult to 
place security forces in its borders. In addition to that, the culprits have a wider area for the operation and they 
might commit crime in the territorial waters of a particular State and slightly navigate towards another country’s 
territorial waters to escape the arrest. So, even if a country’s security control is strong enough, it might be not 
easy to properly combat the crime if a neighbouring country’s security control is weak. Also, most of the African 
countries’ economy is weak, the fight needs high technological equipment, logistics and infrastructure that are 
not easy for a developing country to afford. Thus, it needs joint forces and strategies in order to combat piracy 
activities in the gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, for example, in fighting piracy activities happening within its territorial 
waters transformed its Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope, which initially was formed to fight conflicts 
which was taking place in the Niger Delta, into an expanded maritime security framework known as Operation 
Pulo Shield.5 
Ghana and Benin also in their individual capacity try to combat piracy activities taken place in their 
territorial waters by formulating policies, strengthen surveillance systems, creating Maritime Awareness Domain 
(MDA) capabilities etc. While Ghana in 2011 pressed an order from China Poly Technologies Incorporated as 
part of a larger drive to modernize its navy, two 46 metre patrol vessels, Benin received a grant of four million 
Euros from China for the purchase of patrol boats6, the vessels were intended to be used in the fight against 
piracy off Ghana and Benin coasts and to strengthen maritime security over the area.  In 2012 Togolese army 
                                                          
1 Crisis Group Report No. 195 supra 
2 Crisis Group interview, expert on Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS, Libreville, 23 January 2012 
3 India Blooms News Service, Ban urges collective action to fight piracy in Central Africa. (New York, Aug 24 (IBN S): 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called Friday on Central African leaders to collectively focus on conflict 
prevention in the sub-region and to fight the threats of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other security challenges) 
August 2013 available at: http://www.indiablooms.com/ForeignDetailsPage/2013/ForeignDetails240813f.php 
4  Nick De Vlaminck, Angola Working to Counter Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. April 19 2015 available at: 
http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/04/angola-working-to-counter-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/ 
5 Freedom C. Onuoha, Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Aljazeera Centre for Studies, 12 June 2012. 
Available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012612123210113333.html. 
6 Roger L. Phillips, an Arms Race at Sea. November 8, 2011. Available at: http://piracy-law.com/page/22/ 
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agreed to hire private security companies to guard anchored vessels at the port of Lome.1 In 2014 the month of 
February Ivory Coast announced about expansion of its navy by forty (40) vessels to help combat piracy within 
its waters.2 But still there was a need to join forces of all states along the gulf of Guinea to easily combat piracy 
activities that are rampant in the area. So they organized themselves and with the guidance of the Security 
Council of the United Nations through the economic communities, to strategize on combating piracy. 
West African States, through its Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have since 
then been formulating plans on how to combat piracy in their coastal areas. Unlike the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), which seem to be stable in its plans pertaining maritime security and 
cooperation amongst member states and implementation of the same, ECOWAS started to be triggered by the 
sudden emergence of piracy off Benin coast in 2011. With assistance from partner states like the United 
Kingdom, ECOWAS commission began to harmonize its country member’s maritime policies and to establish 
more integrated approach to maritime affairs. 3  In doing this ECOWAS has developed strategies for the 
implementation of its plans for maritime surveillance network, maritime security, maritime safety and 
information sharing.4Continuous information sharing and the need to improve oil and gas governance as a means 
of preventing class struggles were emphasized by ECOWAS. 
Copying from its neighbor ECCAS, ECOWAS has also divided its coastal area into three operational 
zones aiming at each zone to pool resources and to take joint efforts for their maritime security. Nigeria, Benin, 
Togo and Niger are countries comprised zone E which is the pilot zone. Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra-Leonne fall under zone F while Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali and 
Senegal fall under zone G. This, if taken seriously and if implemented accordingly, will help to the great extent 
to eliminate piracy activities along the coastal states of gulf of Guinea. The resolution to establish a regional 
maritime coordination security centres was taken place in 2013, June at Yaounde, a capital city of Cameroon, 
during the ECOWAS summit summoned purposely for discussion on how to respond to the piracy influx in the 
gulf’s coastal states5. 
Council for European Union, during its meeting sat in March 2015 passed a resolution to support the 
regional action plan 2015-2020 set for combating piracy in the gulf of Guinea. This decision was reached after 
the ECOWAS to submit its proposal to the council members, showing a desire to continue cooperating with 
partner countries in combating piracy and other sea crimes.6 
There is also Memorandum of Understanding between International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
the Maritime Organization of West and central Africa to establish, inter alia, sub-regional integrated coast guard 
network in West and Central Africa. 
Records show that there is an increased number of attacks despite the efforts put forward by regional 
country members and their partners. The African Union has set an objective to implement the African Maritime 
Security Strategy by 2050. Amongst the strategy’s goals are to “ensure security and safety of maritime 
transportation system” and to “prevent hostile and criminal acts at sea, and to harmonize the prosecution of the 
offenders”7. 
 
6. Challenges hindering the effective implementation of strategies to combat piracy in the gulf of Guinea 
Although there are efforts to combat piracy activities in the gulf of Guinea, from the international level coming 
down to the regional level and finally country level, since the emergence of an influx of these activities along the 
coastal states of the gulf, the situation still persists to date. The persistence of piracy in the gulf of Guinea is 
evidenced by a number of challenges that need to be overcame for the effective control of maritime security in 
general and piracy in particular. These are divided into legal challenges, economic challenges, political 
challenges and cultural challenges. This part analyses all the challenges evidenced to restrict the combat against 
piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea coastal states. 
 
6.1 Weak law enforcement 
It is clear that the current legal regime in the gulf of Guinea countries is not comprehensive in respect of the 
                                                          
1  Gard, Togo Implements New Antipiracy Measures. July 4, 2012 available at: 
gard.no/content/20651727/gard%20alert%20Togo%20implements%20new%20anti-piracy%20measures.pdf 
2 David Puglease, Ivory Coast to expand navy by 40 Ships to Fight Piracy. Ottawa Citizen, February 9, 2014 
3 Crisis Group Interview, UK diplomat. Abuja 9 February 2012 
4 A draft of ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy, a version shared with Crisis Group in March, 2012 
5  Oscar Nkala, Maritime Center to Fight Gulf of Guinea Piracy. March 27, 2015 available at: 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/coast-guard/2015/3/27/ecowas-launches-maritime-center-fight-gulf-of-
guinea-piracy/70561604 
6 ibid 
7  Nirit Ben-Ari, Piracy in West Africa: A bumpy road to maritime security. December 2013 page 12 available 
at:www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/December – 2013/piracy – West Africa. 
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enforcement of either international law or domestic laws against piracy perpetrators. The criminal justice system 
is weak and thus the independence of judiciary is impracticable. Sometimes it is due to corruption practices and 
incompetence of high level governmental officials which allow the offenders to diverge the punishment or to 
receive lighter punishment in exchange of corruption. Even stakeholders’ efforts when trying to enforce 
compliance of rule of law or to impose sanctions in the event breached are undermined. However, in this part 
issues of scarcity of domestic legal instruments, unwillingness of States to prosecute offenders, the legal status of 
private security guards and position of UNCLOS on combating piracy are going to be discussed. 
6.1.1 Lack of domestic legal instruments  
It is evidenced that individual states are unwilling to domesticate international conventions relating to maritime 
security to which they freely signed. Resolution 18511 reiterated that the SUA Convention 1988 provides for 
parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction and accept into their custody those persons responsible 
for piracy. Whilst the SUA Convention makes it an offence if person seizes or exercises control over a ship by 
threat or use of force thereof or any form of intimidation, enforcement relies upon the traditional jurisdictional 
bases of nationality and territoriality.  
Most of gulf of Guinea countries do not have national legislations suitable to incriminate piracy 
offenders. This has made difficult if not impossible for navies to, when capturing pirates, to prosecute them. 
Nigeria, for example, does not have legislation for piracy. Highlighted by Commander Oladipo Oluwole, during 
his visit to the Cross River State Legislature in Calabar that, the navy and other maritime security agencies were 
unable to take the battle to the pirates because existing laws do not permit firing at the pirates nor allow the 
prosecution of those who captured.2 
At least Togo have piracy legislation ‘Code de la Marine Marchande (Ordonnance No. 129 du 12 Aout 
1971)’. Articles 147 and 149 of this code have defined crime of piracy and stipulate elements of piracy and 
differentiate the punishment of acts of piracy based on the gravity of the offence and the consequences thereof. 
In this Code, there is imprisonment sentence; life imprisonment sentence and death sentence if the actions 
resulted to death or serious bodily physical harm to the victims.3 But the death sentence punishment is against 
the International law, basing on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 that stipulates for the right to 
life for every human being4. 
6.1.2 Unwillingness to prosecute piracy perpetrators 
For the prosecution of pirates’ offenders and imprisonment, there is a challenge for some countries not to be 
willing to prosecute, the reason being to avoid citizens with bad characters in their countries. There is a 
possibility of a released pirate to seek asylum to a country where he was serving a sentence. In 2008 the British 
Foreign Office advised its Royal Navy not to detain pirates of certain nationalities if their national laws included 
execution, or mutilation as a judicial punishment for committing piracy.5 This can also jeopardize prosecution of 
these cases even in countries where the offences have been committed, because prosecution involves adducing of 
evidences by witnesses for the sake of establishing and proving cases against pirates’ perpetrators. These 
witnesses need protection for their safety, if there is no assurance for that, most of the people will not be willing 
to appear before the court and testify against offenders for fear of endangering their lives. If the law makes it an 
offence for the actual pirates and their lords and abettors, and if the mission is to really eliminate acts of piracy in 
our coastal areas to make shipping transport safer as well as States’ maritime security, the protection of 
witnesses and informers are of crucial important, otherwise these innocent and well-wisher people will not 
volunteer to testify or to provide useful information about pirates and their networks. Therefore, the combat 
against piracy will be only sweet stories for the ears and the pleasing thoughts good for the hearts. 
6.1.3 Challenges imposed by the UNCLOS 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s definition of piracy is narrow in a sense that it confined 
itself in situations where piracy activities are only conducted on the high seas and where there is an involvement 
of two vessels. The UNCLOS definition does not cover situations where one vessel is involved in piracy; for 
instance, where a crew member or a passenger of the same vessel attack the vessel or caused the same to be 
attacked for the private ends intention. 
In addition to that, the UNCLOS provisions pertaining piracy do not impose mechanisms to secure 
prosecutions of the offenders. Articles 100 – 107 of the UNCLOS that vividly deal with piracy are silent on the 
mechanisms to prosecute piracy, the provisions only urged States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent on 
                                                          
1Security Council, ‘Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-Based Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight against 
Piracy off Coast; Unanimously Adopting 1851 (2008)’. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9541.doc.htm  
2  Daily Trust, Nigeria: Navy and the Law on Piracy, 18 March 2013. Available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201303181680.html 
3 Articles 151-154 of Code de la Marine Marchande, 1971 
4 Article 3 
5 Woolf Marie, ‘Pirates can Claim UK Asylum’. The Sunday Times, April 13 2008 London. Retrieved on April 22, 2009 
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repression of piracy activities that are taking place on high seas outside any State’s jurisdiction1; how to deal 
with perpetrators has been left to the urged States. And there is no an obligatory provision for States to 
domesticate piracy provisions same way as in UNCLOS. 
6.1.4 The legal status of Private Security Guards is not clear and straight forward 
The use of private security guards has caused the liability issues between Ship Owners or Charterers and the 
Marine Private Security Companies to be complicated. This have resulted some countries in the Gulf of Guinea 
particularly Nigeria, to discourage the use of private security guards onboard ships. By introducing private 
security guards the powers of ship captain is in ambiguous situation, this is because the security guards are 
bound by their own military laws and codes of conduct, different from those agreed upon in the Rules for the use 
of force. This may raise the question of the applicability of the ‘knock for knock’ liability regime which is the 
corner stone of the GUARDCON contract. 
 
6.2 Poor economic of West and Central African Countries 
Most of the countries in west and central Africa are third world countries. All the gulf of Guinea coastal states 
are in this category (developing countries), economically they are poor regardless of the natural resources of oil 
and minerals extracted from their land and waters. Poor economy have been a huge obstacle for the 
accomplishment of maritime security strategies formulated to combat piracy in west and central African States. 
Much of the resources are normally directed to other sectors like health sector, education sector, food, military 
sector for on land security et cetera, to overcome problems existing on those areas. Maritime security is of lesser 
priority, regardless of its contribution to the national economy of the countries. The countries have got too much 
problems to handle but the capacity to overcome all those problems is minimal, due to bribery activities not 
much of the levies are collected. Private companies are so much evading taxes with assistance of corrupted 
governmental officers. 
6.2.1 Local navies are ill equipped 
West and Central African States’ navies are faced with the scarcity of equipment to enable them to comfortably 
and effectively combat maritime crimes including piracy that are rampart to their coastal areas. The cooperation 
established by countries comprised zone D which covers Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome 
and Principe is limited capacitated in combating piracy activities, their navies have only four patrol boats while 
the Corymbe mission deployed by France alone have the same number of vessels.2  
Apart from equipment, west and central Africa local navies are poorly trained, they lack skills to fight 
piracy that are well organized and using modern technology to implement their mission. It is always difficult if 
not impossible to fight and overcome a well-organized enemy by using poor skills and technology. That’s why 
the international partners have directed their assistance on training and equipment to empower local navies and 
enable them to properly combat piracy activities within their region. Because most of piracy attacks in the gulf of 
Guinea happen within territorial waters where they are counted as armed robbery at sea, western countries are 
reluctant to get involved into another commitment on West Africa coast. It is the littoral states’ navies’ 
responsibility to combat these crimes. 
6.2.2 Internal conflicts 
Due to the conflicts between States of West Africa on matters pertaining economic wealth and political rallies, 
cooperation on maritime governance is limited and thus the fight against piracy could not be properly managed. 
For decades now West and Central African Countries have been haunted by internal conflicts as well as conflicts 
between states. This has led the governments to be unstable and to focus much on these conflicts and to forget 
other concerned areas like maritime security. The movement struggle of MEND in Nigeria happening in Niger 
Delta has existed for a long time, representing the economic disadvantaged group, MEND have been for years 
claiming the equal share of the national care obtained from the extraction of oil in Niger Delta. So it has been 
difficult to solely manage to overcome multiple crimes and conflicts happening within the same country 
 
6.3 Political differences between State members 
Despite the cooperation and strategies set by West and Central African States through the umbrella of ECOWAS, 
ECCAS, GGC etc., these countries individually have mistrust against one another. The weaker States fear the 
strong States like Nigeria will take advantage of the cooperation for its own benefit and that the same will use 
the resources that was meant for the cooperation to benefit itself. So the implementation of the Memorandum of 
Understanding that resulted into Yaounde Code of Conduct will not be of the same effect, speaking of which the 
Code itself have focused into diverse issues of maritime security rather than piracy per se. It is easier for the 
                                                          
1 Article 100 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
2   Captain Sylvestre Fonkoua Mbah, Information Sharing in the Gulf of Guinea. Page 11 available at: 
usnwc.edu/getattachement/Events/Regional-Symposia-(1)/RAS-Africa/presentations/4-b/CAPT-FOUNKOUA-
INFORMATION-SHARING-IN-GOG.PDF.ASPX 
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Parties to the Code to select which issue to stress on and which issue no to.  Nigeria would like to play a 
leadership role in the Gulf of Guinea, but such ambitions come up against the tacit opposition of other countries 
who fear this troublesome partner.1 Every country leader likes to maintain sovereign rights to govern its territory. 
6.3.1 Maritime Boarders Conflicts 
The maritime boarders’ conflicts between states within the region impede the cooperation to fight for piracy. For 
instance the maritime boarder dispute between Ghana and Ivory Coast over the segment of their oil rich waters; 
Nigeria and Cameroon maritime boarder conflict over the Bakassi peninsula; Equatorial Guinea maritime 
boarder conflict with Cameroon over an Island at the mouth of the Ntem river; Gabon maritime boarder conflict 
with Equatorial Guinea over the Mbone Island and Corisco Bay bounderies. The State boarders being in a rivalry 
condition with one another jeopardize the efforts to fight piracy regionally as country leaders are not in good 
terms. However, the proximity of Nigeria to zone D countries has necessitated cooperation between ECCAS and 
ECOWAS, especially when attacks happen in ECCAS coast and offenders flee to Nigeria waters, ECOWAS 
country for a refuge. As other states distrust Nigeria, it is all depending on the strategies set by three regional 
institutions, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC rather than between states on zone D and Nigeria.2  
6.3.2 ECOWAS capacity over its member states 
ECOWAS powers to its member states’ maritime policies and practices is merely advisory, it is not binding at all 
and no state shall be held liable if it will not implement as planned and intended by ECOWAS. Most of its 
members have entered into bilateral agreements with partner States over the same issue of maritime security 
outside an umbrella of ECOWAS. The bilateral agreements just like ECOWAS strategies are to fight piracy 
activities in their particular territories. The bilateral agreement made the countries not to actively involve into 
implementing ECOWAS plans, and the donors are of the fear that following regional responses will take a long 
time for all state parties to reach consensus which will delay the matter.3 
 
6.4 Cultural differences 
Differences in civilization of West and Central African States are another factor contributing to the hardship of 
effectively combating piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea coastal states. Different working languages, culture 
and bureaucracies is a reason that hinders communication and trust between leaders. Some countries have 
colonized by France thus use French language for communication while others were colonized by British thus 
they use English language for communication. Also because of these differences and due to the military 
confidentiality principles, some navies are poorly ready to communicate information between coastal states. For 
instance in Nov 2011 the Ghanaian navy received a distress call from an oil barge on fire off the coast of Benin, 
it wanted to communicate to the Togolese navy but due to the wrong telephone numbers they had they failed to 
reach Togolese navy so they have to call airport control tower in Lome which informed the navy,4 this had 
definitely took time and delayed the response. 
 
7. Conclusion 
To sum up, piracy activities in the gulf of Guinea coastal waters have emerged and persisting due to West 
Africa’s unrest civil wars, inability of coastal states to organize effective patrols over their coastal areas, weak 
legal enforcement and judicial structure that led pirates to escape capture and punishment, economic 
underdevelopment that led to ineffective port security control, poor governance of the Gulf of Guinea countries’ 
governments where by corruption practices is common to government officials and actors especially in maritime 
sector and oil sector, and the emergence of west Africa waters as a major source of oil production and supply. As 
a result sea transportation along coastal waters of Gulf of Guinea have been declared to be dangerous and too 
risky for crew members’ lives and cargo carried aboard. Violent actions against crew and theft of cash money 
and property carried aboard have marked the uniqueness of piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea. Due to piracy 
activities the economy of coastal states resulted from sea transportation have been injured, ship owners suffered 
loss due to siphoning of oil cargo carried aboard, increase of insurance premium etc.  
At the beginning, piracy attacks were mostly happened within territorial waters of the Gulf of Guinea 
Coastal States, but later pirates extended their activities and reached high seas where a number of incidents were 
reported to have been committed. Yet the international naval forces are not placed to guard the area, instead 
supports have been offered to the countries off the coast of Gulf of Guinea in order to strengthen their 
capabilities to fight for the crime. The efforts sown by West and Central African States through ECOWAS and 
ECCAS together with GGC on the fight of piracy have not reaped the desired fruits yet. The Yaounde agreement 
though it’s sweetest as it is, yet it will remain to be advisory in nature and has no legal force upon state parties. 
                                                          
1 Crisis Group, the Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone. Africa Report no. 195. December 12, 2012 page 21 
2 ibid 
3 Crisis Group interviews, donor representative Accra, Lome, Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja. January and February 2012 
4 Crisis Group interview, Diplomat in Lome. 25 January 2012 
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So the ultimate decision of prioritizing maritime security and elimination of piracy activities in the Gulf of 
Guinea lies upon individual government of the respective countries.  There is, in a pipe line, United Nations 
strategy of incorporating International Organizations precisely, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to work hand in hand with West and Central 
African States to capacitate them in formulating relevant legislations for piracy, strengthening judicial structures 
and personnel as well as prisons just like the way these organizations assisted in prosecution of piracy offender 
in East African Countries taking into consideration the nature of west Africa piracy. Basing on the analysis, the 
following recommendations are of importance for the avoidance and elimination of piracy activities in the Gulf 
of Guinea. 
 
7.1 Make use of private security guards onboard vessels 
The Gulf of Guinea countries should make use of private security guards aboard the vessels as one way to deter 
and repel pirates from attacking the vessel. The use of private security guards have shown positive results in 
deterring pirates off the coast of Somalia, it only need to be made legal. By employing private security guards 
shipping companies get an opportunity to participate in the combat while protecting their vessels, cargo and 
employees (crew members) aboard the vessel. In the Gulf of Guinea only armed guards from or employed by the 
national forces of the state whose territorial waters a vessel is in, may operate on ships. Nigeria announced to 
detain any vessel entering the country’s territorial and coastal waters with security escorts on board, whether 
armed or unarmed. Up to 2015 Nigeria detained three vessels for having private security guards onboard.1 
Piracy activities off the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea have brought effects not only to the coastal 
states surrounding the area but also to the entire shipping industry the victims of which are multinationals. In a 
single vessels there is involvement of more than one country, there is a country where the ship owners are citizen 
of, there is a country where the vessel has been registered, there are countries where crew members belong, a 
country where owners of property carried aboard are belonged and there is a country where piracy attacks have 
been committed. All these countries are victims of actions taking place in a single sovereign state where no other 
State is allowed to intervene. Governments of Gulf of Guinea Coastal States should be aware of this and consider 
it wisely when practicing their sovereignty right.  
 
7.2 Use of bottom-up rather than up-bottom approach 
Combating piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea countries must be dealt and implemented 
using a bottom-up approach rather than up-bottom approach. It has been vividly observed that the root cause for 
eruption of piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea is movement struggles of the so believed to be the 
disadvantaged group over national resources. The MEND for some time have been in conflict with Nigerian 
government over the oil resources extracted in Niger Delta, the group is linked with the piracy activities 
happened in Nigeria waters in order to increase their influence and funding2 and later extended to Benin and 
Togo waters.3 Movement of a like was observed in Somalia though in a different way, the Gulf of Guinea 
countries need to revise their policies and to strategize on resolving social justice issues that are raised by the 
activities of the extractive industry, particularly oil and gas companies operating in the region. The society 
surrounding the area need to enjoy the benefit of the national wealthy through social services such as health 
services, infrastructure, clean and safe water, food, education and employment. This will reduce the tension of 
people within the area. 
The current approach taken is the top-bottom which will not effectively burnish piracy activities. The 
coercive measures currently in place, is not a long ran solution to the problem after all, evidence shows that 
despite the military use of force, piracy and other maritime related crimes still persist in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
7.3 Enhancing good governance 
The governments need to set-up structural bodies and/or agencies that will deal with corruption to enhance good 
governance. Government official including police officers, military officers, and politicians in Nigeria have been 
mentioned to engage themselves into the grand corruption practices resulted to failure of the government to 
control piracy. First and foremost the government should shutoff the black market business where the siphoned 
oil from ships by pirates and their associates are peddled, the business should remain to the legally established 
and licensed companies. If black market is burnished, pirates will have no place to peddle the siphoned oil and 
thus the tasty of the piracy activities will be lost. 
                                                          
1 UK Club, Piracy and the Gulf of Guinea. 13 February 2015 available at: http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/uk-club-
piracy-and-the-gulf -of-guinea 
2  Christos Kaade, The Gulf of Guinea: Maritime Piracy’s New Global Nerve Centre. Fair Observer. Available at: 
http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/gulf-guinea-maritime-piracys-global-nerve-centre-18429. 
3 Irin Humanitarian News and Analysis, Benin Togo: Joining forces to fight piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94333/benin-togo-joining-forces-to-fight-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea 
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7.4 Prosecution of perpetrators 
There is a need for the Gulf of Guinea countries to ratify International Conventions on piracy and maritime 
security at large, and to incorporate them into their municipal laws for effective control of piracy activities. The 
national penal legislations that analyses procedures and punishment of the perpetrators have to be enacted or 
amended to suit the purpose. The end portion of the combat is the defeat, the purpose of combating piracy is 
defeat, and in this sense the defeat involves deterrence, apprehension, prosecution and sentencing the pirates; this 
can only be properly managed if there is suitable legislations to deal with piracy. Strong military and sweet plans 
and strategies alone are immaterial if there is no law enforcement. Prosecution of piracy offenders have been 
impossible in the region due to lack of relevant law. Nigeria, for example, does not have piracy provisions in its 
legislations and many more west and central African countries have not deposited their legislations containing 
piracy provisions, only Togo amongst all have deposited its legislation ‘Code de la Marine Marchande, 1971’. 
 
7.5 Strengthening judicial system and structure 
Along with the legislations, the Gulf of Guinea countries need to strengthen their judicial system and structures. 
This can be done by way of imposing judicial personnel (Judges, Prosecutors and Investigators) with the relevant 
knowledge and understanding of piracy as an offence and maritime security in general. Also, courts and prison 
infrastructures must be expanded to enable them to accommodate piracy offenders; new prisons and remands 
should be constructed or the existing ones should be expanded or renovated. Experience can be borrowed from 
East African Countries where with the assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) 
and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have successfully managed to strengthen the judicial and 
prisons capacities.  Judicial personnel and prosecutors and investigators should be provided by personal security 
and that of their families in general so that to make them comfortable and freely doing their job.  On top of that, 
the judiciary must be left independent with no interference from other state organs like Executive and Parliament.  
 
7.6 Vessels be installed with security devices 
Ship owners need to install protective devices into their vessels navigating to the piracy high risk areas in order 
to deter pirates from attacking them. There are several ways of protecting vessels by way of security installations; 
there is water cannon (anti-piracy curtain), aiming at pirates trying to board the vessel or their boats whereby the 
water will flood and disturbing them. There is also Boat trap intended to trap pirates’ boats and disable the motor 
boat propeller. Apart from those, there is Pain Ray (Active Denial System (ADS)) used to deter pirates by 
penetrating the electro-magnetic waves beneath their skin which causes unbearable burning sensation but 
without causing permanent damage to the skin. In addition to that there is Lubricant Foam used to make the deck 
or sides of a vessel slippery to avoid pirates from climbing it; Moreover, Laser beam can be used to provide 
warning to pirates at a distance of over 2 kilometres and at a shorter distances the glare is more intense enough to 
temporarily blind pirates so that they are unable to target their weapons effectively. Further, Sound Cannon 
(Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)) which can emit painfully loud sound frequencies that are enough to 
disorient any approaching pirate; and lastly there is Guardian Anti-piracy Barriers to prevent ladders and 
grappling hooks from getting a hold on the sides of the vessel1. 
 
7.7 Piracy definition needs to be extended 
It is a high time now the definition of piracy and what it covers should be expanded from the narrow one 
available in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 article 101. The narrow definition 
hinders the International Community from fully participating in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
countries since other attacks are happening within the territorial waters of a state where upon the same are 
termed as armed robbery, and the maritime security issues are within the jurisdiction of a particular sovereign 
state. The modus operandi of piracy activities happened in high seas is not different from those actions of the 
same nature happening in territorial waters and within Exclusive Economic Zones, to differentiate the two is to 
make the fight problematic. Piracy actions should attract universal jurisdiction whereupon those happening 
within territorial waters of a particular state should be open for the country itself, the country where the attacked 
vessel was registered, countries of nationality of the crew members and countries which the owner of the 
property carried aboard is a citizen; to investigate, try and prosecute the perpetrators. This can be done 
cooperatively upon entering into an agreement, or separately but principles of res judicata and res sub judis must 
be observed.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Christine Mungai, How East African Piracy ended, and lessons West Africa can learn to end Crime on its Waters. Mail and 
Guardian Africa, 22 February 2015. Available at: mgafrica.com/article/2015-02-20-how-somali-piracy-was-ended-unusual-
millitary-collaborations-and-5-very-ingenious-inventions. 
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7.8 A clear stand of where piracy falls under the insurance policies 
The inclusion of piracy in the list of maritime peril in all policies is of crucial importance to avoid double 
insurance over the same peril. Whether it is covered as a maritime peril or as a war risk, there is an importance of 
the legislation to specifically address the matter to avoid duplications or double payments over the same matter. 
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